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Abstract²This paper analyses the existing protection scheme of 
a real distribution system with distributed generators, in Greece. 
Network protection utilizes three successive reclosers at the 
main trunk and fuses at the laterals. The generating units are 
protected by overcurrent and voltage/frequency relays. The 
analysis focuses on the fault-ride-through capability of the gen-
erating units and proposes the resetting of the generators and 
network protection relays so as to conform to the requirements 
imposed by distribution system operators and international 
standards. The proposed protection system guarantees selectivi-
ty for any short-circuits occurring inside or outside the distribu-
tion system, irrelative if the generating units are connected to 
the network or not. Meaningful conclusions are derived from the 
application of the proposed protection coordination principle. 
Index Terms--Distributed Generation, Distribution Systems, 
Fault-Ride-Through, Reclosers Coordination. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A conventional overcurrent protection scheme designed 
for radial distribution lines is usually based on the use of a re-
closer, at the beginning of the feeder, which is coordinated 
with the downstream protection means (overcurrent relays, 
reclosers, and/or sectionalisers) at the main line and with the 
fuses at the laterals [1]. The integration of Distributed Genera-
tion (DG) in distribution networks leads to problems related to 
protection coordination that are difficult to be solved by apply-
ing conventional protection techniques [2], especially when 
DG penetration level increases and island mode of operation is 
expected [3]. It is difficult to coordinate the recloser at a radial 
distribution line with the fuses at the laterals when DG units 
are present in the line. In [4], microprocessor-based reclosers 
with adaptive capabilities have been proposed for achieving 
selectivity in a radial distribution network with DG. This 
scheme applies effectively, but it suggests that the DG units 
will be disconnected before the first reclosing operation. Non-
adaptive microprocessor-based reclosers in conjunction with 
directional elements have been proposed in [5]. Coordination 
between reclosers and fuses has been obtained in [6] with the 
use of synchronized measurements and off-line design calcu-
lations. It is proposed in [7] to replace the fuses at the laterals, 
where DG is connected, with numerical reclosers and relays in 
order to maintain coordination between the overcurrent pro-
tection devices. This methodology was tested in two template 
distribution systems and seems to work adequately, despite the 
fact that some fuse fatigue issues could not be avoided. 
This work aims to investigate the FRT capabilities of the 
generating units in a real distribution system in Greece. Since 
there is no standard framework adopted in Greece, regarding 
FRT requirements of DG units connected to distribution sys-
tems, there is a clear need for developing standard guidelines. 
Furthermore, this paper aims to illustrate that FRT require-
ments can be achieved in actual distribution networks with 
DG units by applying simple modifications in already existing 
protection DG relays and network reclosers. It is intention of 
this work to investigate if FRT can be preserved for faults 
inside the radial distribution feeder, in a way to guarantee an 
islanded network operation in the future. Similar research in 
this field tried successfully to restore recloser-fuse coordina-
tion [4], [5], [6], [7] without considering any time limitations 
imposed by FRT requirements. In [8], FRT requirements have 
been indirectly considered but only faults outside of the radial 
feeders were tested. An effective protection strategy, where 
FRT and islanding have been taken together into account, is 
proposed in [9], but the methodology assumes communication 
between the relays.    
The rest of this paper has been organized as follows. The 
detailed description of the distribution system under investiga-
tion is presented in Section II. Section III addresses the exist-
ing protection scheme and proposes its resetting in accordance 
to FRT requirements. Section IV includes simulation results, 
while Section V provides the derived conclusions. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Distribution system under investigation. 
II. EXAMINED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
A. System Description 
The investigation in this paper concerns an actual 20 kV 
distribution system situated in West Macedonia, Greece (Fig. 
1), to which six synchronous hydro generators are connected. 
Details about the technical data of this distribution system can 
be found in [10]. It should be noted that the generation capaci-
ty is much greater that the total load demand, meaning that 
under specific generation and load conditions, reverse power 
flow is expected. 
B. Existing Protection System 
The main feeder is originally protected by three reclosers. 
The first recloser (Basler BE1-851) is installed in the main 
substation (bus P1) to protect the whole feeder from faults 
occurring along the line from its very beginning. The second 
recloser (Cooper F4) is located at bus P2 that is at the main 
trunk, very close to the initial recloser. The third recloser 
(Cooper F4) is located at bus P29, close to the end of the main 
trunk and near to the area where the DG units are placed. The 
reclosers are named as RP1, RP2 and RP29 respectively, 
based on the buses close to which they are installed. The exact 
position of the reclosers is indicated in Fig. 1 with a red rec-
tangle. The settings of the phase and ground overcurrent ele-
ments of the reclosers are tabulated in Table A1 in the Appen-
dix. The operating characteristics of the ground elements on a 
time-overcurrent plot are shown in Fig. 2. The phase elements 
will be shown later in the paper. Note that RP1 has the same 
time-current characteristic for fast and slow operation. 
There are also expulsion fuses installed at the laterals, 
which have been taken into consideration in this work, despite 
the fact that we are not interested to focus on coordination 
issues between the reclosers and the fuses. The local DSO 
adopts a fuse-saving philosophy meaning that the fuses melt 
before any of the reclosers will begin its slow operation.  
Each DG unit is protected by a common combination of a 
voltage/frequency, an overcurrent, and a residual voltage re-
lay. In most of these elements, multiple stages are set. Table 
A2 in the Appendix summarizes the settings of those relays 
for each DG unit. 
C. Existing Protection Scheme Evaluation 
Selectivity is checked to verify that under all possible sys-
tem operating modes, including operation of the DG units, the 
existing protection scheme adequately protects system com-
ponents and that it is fully coordinated. Only MV protection 
equipment is considered in this analysis, since LV protection 
operation is out of the scope of this study. In other words, it is 
assumed that coordination between the MV and LV protection 
devices exists always. Coordination with the utility network 
line distance protection is also examined. 
For the evaluation, the maximum and minimum phase and 
ground short-circuit currents, sensed by each relay pair or re-
lay-fuse pair, are simulated to determine the tripping time of 
the protection devices. Coordination is guaranteed if adequate 
Coordination Time Interval (CTI) between successive (up-
stream-downstream) protection devices in the MV system is 
observed for all simulated short-circuits. The simulations 
showed that the reclosers are properly set and that selectivity 
is guaranteed for all examined fault types and locations (inside 
the MV network), including specific non-solid short-circuits.  
Let us give an example of adequate coordination between 
the reclosers RP1, RP2, and RP29. Fig. 3 shows the reclosing 
sequence of all three reclosers for a permanent, solid, three-
phase short-circuit at time t = 1 s, close-in to RP29. In this 
figure, the rms current measured by the reclosers (current at 
the primary side of the current transformer) is shown. In the 
VDPH ILJXUH ³)7´ DQG ³67´ VWDQGV IRU WKH IDVW WULS DQG WKH
VORZ WULS UHVSHFWLYHO\ ZKLOH ³2´ DQG ´/´ PHDQV RSHQ DQG
lockout time interval respectively. 
 
Figure 2.  Ground element characteristics of the reclosers. 
 
Figure 3.  Reclosing operations due to a 3PH fault close-in to RP29 
Fig. 4 depicts the phase element time-overcurrent charac-
teristics of the reclosers, from which the tripping time for this 
particular short-circuit can be determined. It can be seen that 
RP29, which is closer to the fault, trips first (in 53 ms) accord-
ing to its fast characteristic. Only RP29 performs reclosing 
operations, since the faults is located downstream of RP29. 
Hence, after three delayed subsequent reclosing operations, 
RP29 switches to a lockout state.  
It should be noted that for all simulated short-circuits, if 
DG units are connected to the 20 kV distribution network, at 
least one of them will be tripped after 100 ms due to un-
dervoltage protection. In the abovementioned short-circuit 
scenario, the units DG1 and DG4 are tripped by the undervolt-
age relay during the first open time interval of RP29.  
III. FAULT-RIDE-THROUGH CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Fault-Ride-Through Requirements 
According to recent DSO practices, all generating plants 
connected to MV networks must remain connected to the grid 
during a fault, for a time that depends on the voltage dip 
caused by the fault. Otherwise, the instant disconnection of a 
large amount of DG due to a fault may threaten the stability of 
the whole system [3]. Many countries around the world have 
started standardising Fault-Ride-Through (FRT) requirements 
[11], but until today there is not a global standard developed, 
although there is a continuing progress on this [12], [13], [14]. 
 
Figure 4.  Tripping times for a 3PH fault close-in to RP29 
 
Figure 5.  FRT guidelines 
Concerning the FRT capability of type-1 (synchronous 
machine based) generating plants, technical guideline [15] 
indicates the graph depicted in Fig. 5. This graph determines 
the time in ms that a generator must remain connected to the 
grid with respect to the per unit voltage drop caused at the 
JHQHUDWRU¶VFRQQHFWLRQSRLQWGXHWRDVKRUW-circuit fault in the 
grid. For instance, a generator must remain connected to the 
network for a time duration of at least 150 ms in case of a sol-
id short-circuit that would cause a 100% voltage drop at the 
JHQHUDWRU¶VSRLQWRIFRQQHFWLRQ 
There is no standard framework in Greece regarding FRT 
requirements of DG units connected to distribution systems. 
Therefore, in this paper, we adopt the voltage related FRT 
requirements of [15], which are quite challenging to obtain. 
B. Modification of Protection Settings 
It has been addressed in Section III.B that, in case of a 
short-circuit fault in the MV distribution network, at least one 
hydro generator will be tripped due to undervoltage protec-
tion. For instance, it has been shown that if a permanent, solid, 
three-phase fault occurs in front of RP29, units DG1 and DG4 
will be tripped. Indeed, Fig. 6 illustrates the response of the 
generator terminal bus voltages for this particular fault event. 
Green (solid), blue (dash-dotted), black (dotted), and purple 
(dashed) curve represents the terminal voltage response of 
DG4, DG1, DG2 and DG5 respectively. The vertical dashed 
line passes from t = 1.1 s, expressing a time delay exactly 
equal to 100 ms after the fault incidence, whereas the horizon-
tal dashed line expresses the undervoltage setting (0.9 pu) of 
the generator voltage relays.  
 
Figure 6.  Voltage response for a 3PH fault close-in to RP29 
 
Figure 7.  Existing and modified characteristics of RP2 
It can be seen in Fig. 6 that the terminal voltages of DG2-
DG5 recover after 53 ms from fault inception, which is the FT 
time delay of RP29 (depicted with the dashed-dotted vertical 
line in Fig. 6). However the terminal voltages of units DG1-
DG4 remain below the 0.9 pu setting for 100 ms. Thus, these 
units will be tripped by the undervoltage element at time t = 
1.1 s. Obviously, this is not acceptable from the FRT point of 
view. According to [15], the DG units should remain connect-
ed for at least 150 ms under any voltage drop condition, which 
does not actually happen. In order to conform to the FRT re-
quirements, modifications in the protection settings are pro-
posed. Since, the undervoltage elements are the most restric-
tive among the DG protection elements in terms of tripping 
time, the resetting procedure begins from them.  
The actual voltage relays installed at the power plants pro-
vide only definite-time undervoltage elements. Being aware of 
the current protection relay technology, we conceptualized to 
adjust the settings of the undervoltage elements so that they 
will match exactly the graph of Fig. 5. For this purpose, one 
definite-time undervoltage element and a rate of change of 
voltage magnitude (dv/dt) element are required to replicate the 
graph of Fig. 5. The definite-time element will be set to trip 
the units in 150 ms if the voltage drop at the connection point 
is more than 30% of the nominal voltage magnitude (V < 0.7 
pu). The dv/dt element will be set with a slope equal to that 
shown in Fig. 5, corresponding to voltage drops between     
0.1 pu - 0.3 pu. As an example, a fault that causes a 100% 
voltage drop will be cleared in 150 ms, while one that causes 
20% voltage drop will be cleared in 1100 ms. It is obvious that 
the proposed protection modification requires the existing 
voltage relays to be replaced with new ones. 
By resetting the undervoltage elements, compliance of DG 
protection with the FRT requirements is achieved. Since, 
however, the investigation concerns a radial distribution sys-
tem with reclosers, FRT requirements should be fulfilled by 
the reclosers as well. Therefore, new settings for the reclosers 
should also be proposed. In fact, the fast operation of the re-
closers must be delayed to permit the operation of the DG 
units for as long as indicated by Fig. 5. By increasing the FT 
time delay, the ST time delay may also be adjusted so that 
coordination between the reclosers is preserved.  Careful deci-
sion should be made to not increase the tripping times of the 
reclosers significantly. It is understood that if the FT are con-
siderably increased, the first operation of the reclosers will not 
actually be so fast and the fault clearing times in the network 
may become prohibitive.  
Based on Fig. 5, there is no need to increase the first re-
closer operation beyond 0.7 s - 1.5 s. Taking into account that 
the larger time delays correspond to smaller voltage drops, 
which are usually not very possible for phase faults due to the 
grounding method (resistively grounded secondary of the bulk 
HV/MV distribution transformer), time delays larger than 0.7 
s are expected only for remote and/or non-solid single-phase-
ground short-circuits. On the other hand, since a fuse-saving 
philosophy is originally followed, the increase in the tripping 
time of the reclosers may in some cases distort selectivity be-
tween the reclosers and the fuses at the laterals. In other 
words, there may be some short-circuit incidents in the laterals 
that will cause the blowing of a fuse prior to the operation of 
any recloser. However, this is a safe side compromise, which 
can be taken to fulfill FRT requirements in distribution sys-
tems with fuses at the laterals, unless the replacement of the 
fuses with overcurrent relays is available. The latter, although 
expensive, would provide significant advantages in the protec-
tion system [16].  
The modified recloser settings are shown in Table 1. Fig. 7 
shows how the modification changes the time-overcurrent 
characteristics of RP2. 
 
TABLE 1.  MODIFIED RECLOSER SETTINGS 
 
P1 Phase Element P1 Ground Element 
Curve E2 Curve I1 
Time Dial 1 Time Dial 4 
Pickup Current 400 A pr. Pickup Current 50 A pr. 
Inst. pickup 1920 A pr. Instant. pickup - 
Open intervals 0.6-5-10 s Open intervals 0.6-5-10 s 
P2 Phase Element P2 Ground Element 
Fast Curve 113 Fast Curve 136 
Slow Curve 135 Slow Curve 142 
Pickup Current 280 A pr. Pickup Current 60 A pr. 
Open intervals 0.5-5-10 s Open intervals 0.5-5-10 s 
P29 Phase Element P29 Ground Element 
Fast Curve 117 Fast Curve 113 
Slow Curve 120 Slow Curve 134 
Pickup Current 140 A pr. Pickup Current 40 A pr. 
Open intervals 0.5-5-10 s Open intervals 0.5-5-10 s 
 
C. Evaluation of the Modified Protection Scheme 
In order to evaluate the modified protection settings, we 
simulated various short-circuit events. As a result of the modi-
fications made to the DG undervoltage elements, the genera-
tors remain connected to the network for the maximum re-
quired time, according to the FRT requirements for those lev-
els of voltage drop. 
For illustrative purposes, the permanent, solid, three-phase 
short-circuit in front of RP29 at t = 1 s is presented below. For 
this particular short-circuit, all DG units experience a voltage 
drop at the point of connection that varies between 0.15 pu 
and 0.52 pu. Thus, based on the modified undervoltage set-
tings, they are disconnected after exactly 150 ms.  
RP29 performs its first opening, 265 ms after the fault in-
ception. This increase in tripping time, required for permitting 
the operation of the DG units for 150 ms, has been achieved 
by selecting a different type of inverse time characteristic (see 
Table 1) for the reclosers. The adjusted characteristics give a 
delayed trip command in comparison to the existing character-
istics. Fig. 8 illustrates the complete reclosing sequence of 
RP29. Immediate conclusions can be drawn by comparing 
Fig. 3 with Fig. 8. In Fig. 3 we had a fast trip after 53 ms from 
the fault occurrence, while now it takes 265 ms for the breaker 
to trip.  
Short-circuits located relatively away from the DG units 
may cause reduced voltage drops at the generators terminal 
bus and delayed tripping times of the reclosers. As an exam-
ple, we simulated a double-phase-ground short-circuit with a 
fault resistance Rf  ȍDSSOLHGDWWLPHLQVWDQWt = 1 s at the 
beginning of line P2-P10. This fault causes RP2 to trip first 
after 356 ms (Fig. 9). RP29 will not pick-up for this fault (Fig. 
9). If the fault is permanent, the DG units will trip after a time 
delay determined from the FRT characteristic, depicted in Fig. 
5. If this is expected to happen after the first reclosing, the 
open interval time of the recloser should accordingly be ad-
justed to avoid this situation. Hence, the short-circuit contribu-
tions from the generators will be interrupted by the DG protec-
tion. Assume now that the fault was self-cleared during the 
first open interval of the recloser RP2. Then, the system would 
survive the disturbance and normal operation would be re-
stored after a short supply interruption. Fig. 10 illustrates the 
response of the generators terminal voltages for the latter case. 
It can be seen that voltages restore to normal magnitudes after 
the first reclosing of RP2. Care should be taken to guarantee a 
synchronized reclosing (i.e. through synchrocheck relays). 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
It has been seen that a simple resetting of the DG and net-
work protection relays is able to create conditions to meet the 
FRT requirements. On the other hand, in order to modify the 
protection system adequately, replacement of the voltage re-
lays with more advanced ones is necessary. 
In general, the fast operation of the reclosers must be de-
layed to permit the operation of the DG units for as long as 
indicated by the FRT requirements. This will increase the trip-
ping time of the reclosers. Time delays larger than 0.7 s are 
expected only for a number of remote and/or single-phase-
ground faults.  
 
Figure 8.  Reclosings due to a 3PH fault close-in to RP29 
 
Figure 9.  First trip time delays 
 
Figure 10.  DG terminal bus voltage response 
Selectivity is guaranteed in the MV network for all exam-
ined short-circuit types and locations. On the other hand, the 
increase in the tripping time of the reclosers may in some cas-
es distort selectivity between the reclosers and the fuses at the 
laterals. This, however, is a safe side compromise, which can 
easily be faced if protection relays are to be installed instead 
of fuses. Then, a cost-benefit analysis is required. In the simu-
lated cases presented in this paper, mostly permanent short-
circuits have been assumed for illustrative purposes. If self-
clearing or short-lasting short-circuits are considered, it is un-
derstood that DG units and the system can ride-trough such 
disturbances, permitting the normal operation of the distribu-
tion system after the extinction of the faults. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1.  RECLOSERS TIME-OVERCURRENT SETTINGS 
 
P1 Phase Element P1 Ground Element 
Curve E2 Curve I1 
Time Dial 1 Time Dial 4 
Pickup Current 400 A pr. Pickup Current 80 A pr. 
Instant. pickup 1920 A pri Instant. pickup - 
Open intervals 0.6-5-10 s Open intervals 0.6-5-10 s 
P2 Phase Element P2 Ground Element 
Fast Curve 107 Fast Curve 132 
Slow Curve 132 Slow Curve 142 
Pickup Current 280 A pr. Pickup Current 60 A pr. 
Open intervals 0.5-5-10 s Open intervals 0.5-5-10 s 
P29 Phase Element P29 Ground Element 
Fast Curve 105 Fast Curve 102 
Slow Curve 112 Slow Curve 161 
Pickup Current 140 A pr. Pickup Current 40 A pr. 
Open intervals 0.5-5-10 s Open intervals 0.5-5-10 s 
 
TABLE A2.  DG PROTECTION RELAYS SETTINGS 
DG1 (Vrysochori) 
  Phase Element Ground Element 
1st stage DT (I>) ā,Q 1st stage DT (I>) ā,Q 
Time Delay (T>) 3 s Time Delay (T>) 1.0 s 
2nd stage DT (I>>) ā,Q 2nd stage DT (I>>) ā,Q 
Time delay (T>>) 2 s Time Delay (T>>) 0.5 s 
3rd stage DT (I>>>) ā,Q 3rd stage DT (I>>>) - 
Time Delay (T>>>) 0.05 s Time Delay (T>>>) - 
Voltage Element Frequency Element 
Undervoltage (U<) 0.9 pu Underfrequency (f<) 49.5Hz 
Time Delay (T<)  0.1 s Time Delay (T<) 0.1 s 
Overvoltage (U>) 1.11pu Overfrequency (f>) 50.5Hz 
Time Delay (T>) 0.1 s Time Delay (T>) 0.1 s 
Residual Voltage Element 
1st stage (3Vo>) 15 V Time Delay (T>) 4 s 
 
DG2 and DG3 (Perivoli) 
  Phase Element Ground Element 
1st stage DT (I>) ā,Q 1st stage DT (I>) ā,Q 
Time Delay (T>) 2 s Time Delay (T>) 0.5 s 
2nd stage DT (I>>) ā,Q 2nd stage DT (I>>) ā,Q 
Time delay (T>>) 1 s Time Delay (T>>) 0.1 s 
Voltage Element Frequency Element 
Undervoltage (U<) 0.92 pu Underfrequency (f<) 49.5Hz 
Time Delay (T<) 0.1 s Time Delay (T<) 0.1 s 
Overvoltage (U>) 1.08 pu Overfrequency (f>) 50.5Hz 
Time Delay (T>) 0.1 s Time Delay (T>) 0.1 s 
Residual Voltage Element 
1st stage (3Vo>) 15 V 2nd stage (3Vo>>) 20 V 
Time Delay (T>) 3 s Time Delay (T>>) 2 s 
 
DG4 (Distrato) ± DG5 (Alatopetra) 
  Phase Element Ground Element 
1st stage DT (I>) ā,Q 1st stage DT (I>) ā,Q 
Time Delay (T>) 2 s Time Delay (T>) 0.5 s 
2nd stage DT (I>>) ā,Q 2nd stage DT (I>>) āIn 
Time delay (T>>) 1 s Time Delay (T>>) 0.1 s 
3rd stage DT (I>>>) ā,Q 3rd stage DT (I>>>) - 
Time Delay (T>>>) 0.1 s Time Delay (T>>>) - 
Voltage Element Frequency Element 
Undervoltage (U<) 0.92pu Underfrequency (f<) 49.5 z 
Time Delay (T<) 0.1 s Time Delay (T<) 0.5 s 
Overvoltage (U>) 1.08pu Overfrequency (f>) 50.5Hz 
Time Delay (T>) 0.1 s Time Delay (T>) 0.5 s 
Residual Voltage Element 
1st stage (3Vo>) 20 V Time Delay (T>) 5 s 
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